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[H1]                      Nation-Building and Minority Rights in the Middle East: 
A Dialectic Dynamic 
 
 
Numerous and converging indications suggest that the religious minorities of the 
Middle East are living at a critical juncture in this early 21
st
 century.
1
 Every other day, news 
bring the subject to the front pages, mentioning tensions raised in Algeria by the conversion 
of a few dozen citizens to Christian evangelism, persecutions suffered by non-Muslims in 
Northern Iraq, sectarian strife in the rest of the country or in Lebanon. And although full of 
promises, the revolutionary wind blowing from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic in the 
early 2010s raises new interrogations. What is often referred to as a global minority crisis 
“in the Arab world” or “in the Muslim world” is a complex phenomenon which combines 
structural and cultural dimensions, and needs to be examined in light of its historical 
background and sociological context. On the one hand, it is a structural crisis where 
demography and law are determining factors. A long-term difference in birth rates and 
emigration traditions between religious and confessional groups resulted in deep demographic 
imbalance while several decades of discriminating legislation deepened the gap.
2
 On the other 
hand, the current “minority crisis” is a crisis of difference: a crisis where “relation between 
individuals is characterised by uncertainty” because the old social and cultural order is falling 
apart.
3
 Together, structural and cultural factors combine. In view of the hundreds of thousands 
of people who took refuge in another country of the Middle East or emigrated in the West 
during the recent decades, we cannot but acknowledge that several religious and confessional
4 
minorities do not enjoy freedom in their homeland where they may be symbolically excluded 
from the public sphere and political life and more than often oppressed and even condemned 
to exile. To use Hirschmanian categories, their response to their precarious situation is either 
exit or silence.
5
 
                                                 
1
 Schatzmiller 2005: 14. I am far from sharing the analyses presented in her introduction. 
2
 Courbage and Fargues 1997;  Jones 2006: 252. 
3
 Balandier 1986: 501. 
4
 In the following I use the term “confessional” to mean religious and confessional as a confessional group is de 
facto part of a larger religious one. However in this chapter the variable of interest is less the doctrine or faith of 
the group than its collective social identity. For that reason, I use the terms “community” to refer to the group as 
a social organization and “communalism” as a sociological concept and a social formation in history. In order to 
refer to the collective political identity and mobilization of the group, I use the terms “sect” and “sectarianism”. 
Cf. Joseph and Pillsbury 1978. 
5
 Hirschman 1970. 
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The more so because in several circumstances this existential crisis lead to 
multidimensional violence: the structural violence of unequal constitutional laws enacted for 
specific identity groups; the spatial displacement or forced exile of local communities; 
assaults against individuals; street fighting along lines separating religious or sectarian 
communities; or even unnamed civil war. Truly, social sciences cannot underestimate the 
seriousness of the crisis. Mainly, history and sociology are needed to look into the genealogy 
of the crisis and take its context into account in order to overcome the blunt characterisation 
of violence against religious minorities as a cultural stigma specifically associated with the 
societies and polities of the Middle East. Political sociology, for its part, is required to shed 
light on the complex relation between the political power which claims sovereignty and the 
exclusive use of “legitimate violence” (or legal use of force) - “the state” - on the one hand, 
and victimized and powerless sectarian communities, on the other hand.  
 
In order to do so, this chapter is organised under three main themes.  
First, it offers a retrospective look at the process of importation and adaptation of the 
nation-state formula in the newly created and/or newly independent entities of the Middle 
East. The main hypothesis is that diverging constitutional choices – either the choice of 
government of the demographic majority (Tocquevillian democracy) or the choice of 
“consensus democracy” - namely the government of a coalition of identity groups 
acknowledging specific constitutional rights for the minorities
6
 – shaped state-society relation 
differently in each country of the region where they yielded both positive and negative effects 
which need to be assessed.  
Second, this chapter reflects on today‟s revival of the minority issue and endeavours to 
analyze its specificity. My contention is that the minority crisis of today is radically different 
from the crisis which stirred social and political mobilisations in the 19
th
 century although it is 
also the product of a combination of a specific international conjuncture – “glocalization”7 - 
and its internalisation by local societies in the Middle East. Namely, I assume that the 
authoritarian regimes established in the region since the mid-1950s tend to compensate for the 
failure of their pro-active national development policies and flamboyant regional ambitions by 
“redeploying the state”: leaving the management of national economies to private actors and 
investing rather in security and in the cultural and religious sectors they had until then 
                                                 
6
 For a comparative analysis of the two constitutional systems, cf. Lijphart 1999. 
7
 Roudomatof 2005. 
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neglected.
8
 Correlatively, the minority issue becomes the great “question of the century”9 fed 
by exacerbated identity fundamentalisms and established at the global level as a legitimate 
problem through the birth of a new international humanitarian Law. This is why the term 
“minority” should be discussed beyond its indistinct reference to groups whose self-
designation, legal status and political function vary widely.
10
  
In the third part, I look at Middle East identity mobilisations in the defence and 
promotion of minority groups and show how they mirror the nationalist ideologies of the 
ruling regimes, often using the same resources and the same strategies, thus questioning the 
supposed contrast between the powerful state and the powerless minority. My hypothesis is 
that the ruling power and the minority compete in the construction of we-groups. They concur 
in the strengthening of identity boundaries in order to access to rare material and symbolic 
resources.  In this respect, religious diasporas play a specific role in politicising identities at 
home, exposing them and supporting them. However, the surprising resilience of the nation-
state suggests that what is taking place between state leadership and minority groups in many 
countries of the Middle East is a political exchange of specific nature and means, which 
challenges the notion of citizenship. 
 
Examination of these three dimensions of the minority issue in the Middle East needs 
to be carried out in comparative perspective in order to open up the understanding of a region 
often stigmatised as “exceptional” and un-amenable to global change. At the same time, a 
sound comprehension of the current situation requires taking into account the specific path 
dependence of the local states. Therefore, I adopt a historical sociology perspective and try to 
read the current crisis in light of the crisis that struck religious minorities in the late Ottoman 
era after the adoption of a revolutionary code of citizenship and the growing interference of 
European powers in the affairs of the non-Muslim minorities of the Empire.
11
 To this day, the 
heritage of the millet system,
12
 the recognition of freedom of religion and culture (and 
sometimes language) and the allocation of a specific personal status to non-Muslim 
                                                 
8
 Levy 2006. 
9
 The quote is from Debray 2008: 227: “La question des minorités est la grande question du siècle. Plus la 
planète se resserre, plus les distances se creusent.” 
10
 For lack of respect of such a requirement, analysis might be plagued by ideological prejudice. See Bengio and 
Ben-Dor 1999. 
11
 Karpat 1982. 
12
 “The millet system of the Ottoman Empire enabled Christian, Jewish and Muslim communities to co-exist 
more or less peacefully, each with their own form of self-government. While the millet system was generally 
human and tolerant of group differences, it was not a liberal society, for it did not tolerate individual dissent 
within its constituent communities. Rather it was a deeply conservative, theocratic and patriarchal society”. 
Kymlicka 1992: 143. 
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confessional communities are the major stakes of the legal and judicial institutions in most 
regional states. At the time of independence a large majority of them kept the confessional 
variable into account when enacting and applying personal and family law. Some of them 
even inscribed the legal pluralism inherited from the Ottomans into their constitutional rule. 
Today, the millet system – or at least its remaining – imposes a specific meaning (in the 
Geertzian sense)
13
 to the organisation of the local societies. It provides clues for 
understanding the power brokering at work between the minorities and the state. But at the 
same time, “it distils complex social categories into bounded categories whose 
correspondence to reality is problematic.”14 By consequence, it is a controversial concept as 
some analysts consider it a source of inspiration for liberalising the status of minority groups 
while others denounce its fragmenting role and the subsequent paralysis of the nation-building 
process in the Middle East.  
 
 
[H2] Minorities and nation-states 
 
Middle Eastern states – either succeeding an empire like Turkey and Iran or resulting 
from decolonisation like most Arab states and Israel - were inspired by, and modelled along, 
the 20
th
 century European model of the nation-state. This genealogy is more or less explicit in 
the institutions of the independent state as it is often denied by its political elite. Still, it is 
easily discernable beyond such diverse political regimes as family emirates in the Arab 
Peninsula, hereditary republics like Syria, regimes which refer primarily to Islamic rule such 
as Iran or Sudan, or marginal cases such as Somalia whose statist identity appears dubious. In 
spite of the strong influence of the secularist model,
15
 an overwhelming majority of the local 
states took into account the confessional variable when enacting personal and family law and 
organising the cultural dimension of their public life; even the most secular among them such 
as the Turkish Republic and the Tunisia of Bourguiba could not ignore the impact of religious 
identities on the basic social dynamics in their country.
16
  
                                                 
13
 Geertz 1973: 12-3. 
14
 Peteet 2008: 550. 
15
 As the separation of state from religion became a major characteristic of contemporary Britain and France, the 
major colonial powers in the Middle East.  
16
 In these “secular” states, religious institutions are not autonomous from the state and Islam remains a constant 
reference, implicit or explicit, for the regime. Webb 2008. 
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When it came to enacting a constitution and adopting a modern mode of political 
representation, these states chose between one of the two options offered in Western Europe 
at that time: the majority rule and the consensus rule. 
 
[H3]  Majority rule and the denial of cultural differences 
In the so-called Tocquevillian model, the party and leader who secure the numerical 
plurality of votes in more or less fair, more or less open, electoral processes enjoy the 
legitimate right to govern and impose the state and society their identity and cultural 
preferences.
17
 When the political system presents a certain degree of democracy, it is open to 
a certain degree of uncertainty and the majority of today might eventually become the 
minority of tomorrow.
18
 Also, majority democracy is open to arrangements with minority 
groups and required to organise the legal protection of their collective rights.
19
  
In most modern Middle East countries majority rule bore another meaning and rested 
on another rationale: in order to strengthen their new and often fragile power, the rulers hold a 
discourse of unanimity, either in support of a charismatic or traditional leader, or based on a 
nationalist ideology. Authoritarian regimes were prone to deny cultural (either religious or 
ethnic) pluralism, suppress minority claims and even eradicate minority movements in the 
name of a shared national identity. This was the case when the young Turkish Republic 
expelled non-Muslim populations from Anatolia in the 1920s and when Arab regimes such as 
the Iraqi and Yemeni monarchies tolerated anti-Jewish pogroms and fostered massive 
emigration of their Jewish communities organised by Israel in the 1950s. In 1951, Colonel 
Shishakli, Syria‟s strong man, banished all references to confessional belongings in official 
data such as the national census and in the political sphere. Invoking modernity, he 
suppressed the parliament seats traditionally reserved for religious minorities. The rhetoric of 
this eradication was that applying the principle of secularism shielded non-Muslims from 
being stigmatised because of their religious identity and that the common Arab identity of the 
Syrian people subsumed any sub-national cultural difference.
20
 Since that period, the Syrian 
parliamentary representation is based on formal equality between citizens (one man one vote) 
and the only difference admitted is between “workers” (wage-owners) and other citizens in 
order to enhance the representation of the former. This system is supposed the best suited to 
                                                 
17
 "Il est de l'essence même des gouvernements démocratiques que l'empire de la majorité y soit absolu; car en 
dehors de la majorité, dans les démocraties, il n'y a rien qui résiste"; Tocqueville 1951: 374. 
18
 Przeworski 1988. 
19
 Lijphart 1991. 
20
 In Syria like in Iraq and Turkey, such a stance was first and foremost anti-Kurdish.  
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guarantee individual rights and collective democracy. The state leadership, supposedly issued 
from the national majority, claims to be accountable for its public policies only to “exquisite 
citizens” freed from their confessional (or ethnic) prison.21 
In the last decades, an alternative discourse of unanimity tended to substitute for 
secular nationalisms; namely the reference to the Muslim identity of an overwhelming 
majority of the local populations. In the Middle East, a good number of governments 
amended the national constitution and promulgated new laws to stress the Islamic nature of 
their regime. Beyond their deep differences in nature and processes, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, the Wahhabite Saudi monarchy and the Sudanese dictatorship epitomized this trend. 
Their central reference to Islam allowed each of them to rule arbitrarily in the name of equity, 
social justice and common good, and by the same token to claim to protect non-Muslim 
minorities maintained under their domination by means of social contracts (“pacts”). Majority 
rule, in these cases, amounted to the impossibility of integration in the national community of 
individuals belonging to minority groups and their forced submission to the dominant rule. 
 Since the mid-1950s authoritarian implementation of the so-called majority rule and 
reference to an exclusive or dominant common identity amounted to impose a “forced 
consensus” to religious out-groups.22 What was really taking place was that a family or 
clannish coalition managed to seize power by violent and/or illicit means and monopolize 
political and economic positions in several kingdoms and republics of the Middle East. What 
could be observed was that instead of governing for the sake of the nation, these rulers co-
opted and excluded segments of the society on a regional, ethnic or confessional basis, 
sometimes imposing a ruling majority at odd with its demographic and social weight.
23
 
Among many documented situations stand out the cases of Syria, governed by members of the 
Alawite sect (11 percent of the nation population) since 1970; of Iraq, tyrannised by Saddam 
and his Sunni Ba‟thist networks24 from 1969 to 2003; and the case of Bahrain where a Sunni 
monarchy ruled over a 65 percent Shiite majority.  
Although more recent, experiments of the so-called “Islamic rule” proved even more 
detrimental to minorities because of the discrepancy between legally imposed inequalities and 
official claims for theocratic universalism. In the eye of a ruler referring to a privileged link 
between God and the society, minority groups - even those granted a legal status and some 
                                                 
21
 Ernst Gellner quoted in Leca and Schemeil 1983 : p. 479.  
22
 Copeaux 2000.  
23
 In several cases they condemned the demographic majority (Arab Sunnis in Syria, Arab Shia in Iraq) to 
political minorisation and forbade the birth of program-based alternative majority. Cf. Salamé 1991.  
24
 By network I simply mean stable schemes of horizontal interaction. 
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kind of state protection such as ahl al-kitâb
25
 - remained social anomalies meant to be either 
assimilated by the umma or expelled. Consequently, Bahais were persecuted in Islamic Iran, 
the Sudanese regime fought continuous wars against its animist and Christian populations, 
and the Saudis treated their Shia as a second class population at best. 
Under such rulers, societal response to the alternative integration/exclusion (either you 
belong to the nation or you are condemned to symbolic or exile) revolved around the three 
famous Hirschmanian strategic categories: either tacit submission (“loyalty”) because the 
dominant discourse could only be challenged in privacy; or exposure and political 
mobilisation (“voice”) against the rule of unanimity; or concealment and exile (“exit”) 
because the cost of the previous strategy was not sustainable.
26
 Until 1990, when the conflict 
between the capitalist and socialist worlds over-determined and kept “in the fridge” ethnic and 
religious identities, most religious minorities of the Middle East chose the first response. 
Also, many minority members expected to be part of the promised national development, 
either as its beneficiaries like any citizen or as actors because they enjoyed a high level of 
education and proficiency. Truly a noticeable number of minority members benefited from 
upward mobility in the “nationalist” decades. For example, the history of Egypt in the 1940s 
and 1950s echoed the names of Coptic leaders and intellectuals deeply involved in their 
nation‟s development. All over the Middle East, Christians and Jews were numerous in 
Communist and leftists parties, convinced as they were to share with their Muslim fellow 
citizens a common secular faith in development. Correlatively local leaders and ignorant or 
accomplice Western commentators were prone to praise the aggressive nation-building 
engineered by the state and predict its progressive substitution for obsolete primordial 
identities that used to compete with one another and fragment the nation, such as family links, 
clannish belongings, attachment to a confessional community or an ethnic minority. Still, 
behind this outward unanimity, intractable identity claims kept boiling which were 
occasionally suppressed with extreme state violence such as the crushing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Hama (Syria) in 1982, the assassination of members of the Sadr sâda’ family 
in Najaf (Iraq) and the deportation of thousands of Shia in April 1980,
27
 or the military 
suppression of Shiite demonstrations in the Eastern Saudi province of Hasa in the late 1980s.  
 
[H3]  Minority representation and the improbable nation 
                                                 
25
 People of the Holy Book, meaning mainly the Christians and Jews.  
26
 For an example of the alternative see Bozarslan 2002: 137.  
27
 Tripp 2002: 229-31. 
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After the end of the bipolar era and following the series of identity crises in the 
Balkans and the Caucasus, Middle East authoritarian states invoking national unanimity and 
imposing their rule lost their credibility domestically and internationally. A critical reappraisal 
of the legacy of empires in the region - the Ottoman and Safavid empires but also the 
European colonial empires in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries - revealed the durable impact of their 
institutional engineering of societal pluralism. Social institutions such as the millet, political 
institutions such as minority representation were revisited, often to underline their efficiency 
in the peaceful regulation of state-society relation contrasting with the devastating effects of 
“unanimist” communist and socialist authoritarian regimes.28 In addition to this powerful 
revisionism constitutionalists who reflected on political engineering in the Middle East were 
deeply influenced by North American communitarianism.
29
 Post-conflict constitutional 
schemes increasingly favoured political sectarianism, i.e. the representation of ascribed 
identity groups in state institutions, and consensus government, i.e. the government of a ruling 
coalition of sectarian (and/or other primordial identity) leaders.  
Although most of the Middle East states had broken off with pluralist representation at 
the time of independence or in the thrill of nationalist fever in the 1950s and 1960s, several of 
them kept elements of political confessionalism in their constitutional framework. For 
example there were traces of minority representation in the constitutional systems of states as 
distinct as the Islamic Republic of Iran,
30
 Israel,
31
 Palestine,
32
 or Jordan where a quota of nine 
seats is reserved for Christians in the National assembly (majlis al-umma).
33
 In these states, 
identity played a crucial role in the distribution and exercise of power. Moreover, the relation 
to the state of social groups, but also of individuals belonging to these groups, remained partly 
based on ascribed identities rather than acquired qualities and virtues or constructed interests. 
Ascribed identities were hold as the legitimate criteria to confer cultural, education and even 
territorial autonomy, and more generally to distribute functions, positions, and material and 
symbolic public goods. There was more: the majority itself, either demographic or political, 
                                                 
28
 A good example in Poulton 2000. 
29
 In reference to their attention to minority rights in today‟s diversifying societies. See Etzione 1998.  
30
 The constitution of the Islamic Republic reserves four seats (out of 73) for deputies representing the 
Assyrian/Chaldean, Armenian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian communities. Cf. Sanasarian 2000. The Constitution also 
discriminates against religious minorities. Cf. Fédération internationale des Ligues des droits de l‟Homme, 2003. 
31
 The Jewish state acknowledges three « nationalities » (Jewish, Arab and Druze) with their separate identity 
and communal institutions, whose proximity to the state differ for example in military drafting and access to 
state employment. 
32
 The Palestinian electoral Law of 1995 reserved a quota of 6 seats for the Christians and 1 for the Samaritans; 
in the new electoral Law (2005) 6 out of the 66 seats allocated to the majority system are reserved for Christians. 
33
 At odd with their demographic weight (3-4%) but also with their remarkable share in the private economic 
power (40%), according to Sabbagh 2004. 
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became contaminated in return by the practices of the leadership and tended also to establish 
its relation to the state through confessional criteria, playing on the centrality of its identity 
within the polity. Both government policies and societal responses concurred to reinforce 
sectarian discourses, behaviour and interactions. Finally, the society as a whole tended to 
formulate its political expectations and demands in terms of identity privileges, frustration or 
alienation.  
Identity politics gained momentum as development and welfare policies waned. It was 
argued that, by producing an instant photography of a country‟s diversity, the confessional (or 
ethnic) variable offered a fair criterion to distribute political (as well as economic and 
military) power between segments of the population. Once the groups were counted, fair 
distribution of power could be organised. Strong communal organisation and especially the 
presence of a powerful communal leadership might ensure better participation in the state. 
Rather than competing or splitting apart, the sectarian groups of a given country would 
supposedly become safe about their respective status and share of the cake, and able to come 
to an understanding over power devolution. Minorities, once recognised and legalised, might 
be full actors on the public scene.
34
  
Such a positive assessment was contrasted to the dramatic failure of the “majority” 
rule, a political system still plaguing several countries of the region at the turn of the 
millennium. Eager to see the Middle East “democratize,” the US and its allies not only 
launched devastating military campaigns, they also ambitioned to put an end to the local 
despotic regimes and their “majority” rule and searched for constitutional systems altogether 
adapted to plural nations and respectful of liberal consensus. In the opinion of many 
international experts in state- and nation (re)-building, elite consensus became the key to fair 
political representation of minorities as it was credited to organise fair power sharing between 
confessional (or ethnic) segments of a country‟s population. “Lebanonisation,” once a term 
which stigmatised the shattering agonistic societies in the Balkans, became a desirable model. 
In Lebanon, the executive and the legislature were meant to be equitably distributed along the 
supposed demographic weight of the 18 confessional indigenous groups, which were granted 
cultural, administrative and educational autonomy.
35
 The political history of modern Lebanon 
was referred to as a constant search for inter-confessional balance at state level and the 
government of a large coalition altogether representative of the country‟s major communities 
and respectful of its minorities.  
                                                 
34
 Hanf 
35
 For a succinct and clear presentation of the Lebanese constitutional formula see Kerr 1966. 
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Therefore, liberal (and supposedly democratic) consensus was chosen to rebuild the 
constitutional institutions of war-torn countries such as Iraq and Sudan. The Constitution of 
2005 in Iraq
36
 and the Sudan Peace Agreement in the same year
37
 both entailed a mix of 
traditional individual federalism inspired by the Lebanese formula in line with its Ottoman 
heritage and innovative and far-reaching territorial federalism. While the ethnic (Arab versus 
Kurdish) variable was prevalent in the Iraqi case, confessional belongings tended to become 
the operative rationale behind regional mobilisations, party organisation and even ideological 
division in the Arab two-thirds on the country. In Sudan, the distinction between Muslim and 
non-Muslim regions was the criterion for separate administration and different sets of laws. In 
a complete reversal of analysis, the homogeneous and equalitarian nation-state promoted at 
the time of independences was now seen as an evil. An odd coalition of orientalist scholars 
and neo-conservative administrators re-discovered or re-invented the “true” and intractable 
social dynamics of the local societies: tribes susceptible to be co-opted in the pro-American 
sahwa in Sunni Iraq, African versus Arab “ethnies” (not to say races) segmenting the society 
in Darfur, and religious communities described as the inevitable and constant victims of 
discriminatory minority policies.
38
   
Real life, however, proved far from fulfilling these normative expectations. While 
democracy - or democratisation - became the slogan of constitutional engineering and good 
governance in the Middle East in this early 21
st
 century, one could but notice the gap between 
principles and practices. Here again, the example of the post-Yugoslavian Balkans was far 
from confirming that constitutional promotion of primordial belongings was the key to secure 
minority rights.
39
 Not only individuals in a given religious group remained unequal in their 
relation to their communal leadership but sectarian groups were institutionalised as unequal in 
the eyes of the Law and their access to the state. In Middle Eastern countries where the 
economy is more than often characterised by the prevalence of rent over production profits, 
the exchange of loyalties and symbolic and material goods took place along identity channels 
– confessional belonging being one of the most salient. In other terms, identity politics 
established clientelism as the privileged mode of political exchange.
40
 As a matter of 
consequence competition between sectarian groups for access to public goods fed the 
                                                 
36
 The constitution adopted in January 2005 refers, in its article 9, to the “components of the Iraqi people”. The 
full text of the Iraqi constitution approved by referendum has been translated from the Arabic by the United 
Nations‟ office for constitutional support; See McGarry and O‟Leary 2007. 
37
 UN Security Council, Press release February 2, 2005. 
38
 Davis 2008: 556.  
39
 See International Crisis Group, March 9 March 2009. 
40
 Roniger 2004. 
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persistent fragmentation of the nation and organised endless minority insecurity. 
Notwithstanding that social dynamics (demographic change and social and spatial mobility) 
concurred in belying the basis for the distribution of power and goods between sectarian 
groups, raising incessant frustration and contest as illustrated in post-civil war Lebanon where 
the “consensus” rule had been renewed and reinforced in the new Constitution of 1990 only to 
feed new sectarian strife.
41
   
The problem with the “consensus” formula is that it locks up people in identity 
categories, instilling supposedly primordial differences in the political culture, submitting 
political negotiation to supposed immutable rules and paralysing governmental decision in the 
name of power-sharing. While no society, not even plural societies like the societies of the 
Middle East, is “naturally” sectarian, taking the risk to enhance sectarianism cannot protect 
against authoritarianism. On the contrary, authoritarian regimes are keen to take advantage of 
social segmentation and encourage political fragmentation in order to “counterbalance” 
between rival confessional segments.
42
 Comparative analyses concur: proportional 
representation of segmental groups – either family, clannish or local - might produce the 
closest image of social composition at a precise time, or at least the clearest image. It 
nevertheless results in locking up a society within the boundaries of primordial identities and, 
finally, in freezing and deepening its inner boundaries, with the risk of drawing a nation 
toward civil conflict and secession. Consensus democracy might help the empowerment of 
some segmental groups, especially confessional minorities, in the short time as it succeeded in 
Lebanon in the 1950s and 1960s but it simultaneously hampers the promotion of collective 
interests such as the production and distribution of public goods; it paralyses trans-
confessional dynamics and denies them legitimate political expression.
43
 
 
Certainly, the respective flaws of the majority and consensus rules in securing fair 
minority representation and promoting democratic transition do not exonerate analysts and 
decision-makers for their long-lasting underestimation of minority issues in the Middle East.
44
 
After WW2, the imperative of top-down national development in countries then labelled 
“underdeveloped” was promoted by liberal and Marxist theoreticians concurrently. They were 
far less attentive to primordial identity differences than to inequalities of revenue and class. 
The minorities they had in mind were sociological minorities such as the children deprived 
                                                 
41
 Salamey and Payne 2008. 
42
 As discussed in the Syrian case by Belkin and Schofer 2004. 
43
 Picard 2010. 
44
 For example Picard 1980. 
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from access to health care and education; women deprived from equal human rights; and 
economically deprived peripheries. And they sometimes deliberately ignored cultural 
differences in the name of collective improvement. But today, as the cover is being lifted from 
the identity cauldron and the minority question has become a legitimate and in some cases 
pressing issue, we should remain cautious not to be drawn into another hegemonic discourse 
and suspicious of the role of sectarian entrepreneurs in driving social dynamics and the 
negative effects of their instrumentation.  
 
 
[H2]  “Glocalization” and the minority question 
 
The awakening of the “minority question” in the Middle East was largely the product 
of the new conjuncture of the post-bipolar 1990s: domestically, authoritarian states were 
forced to become “modest” and retreat from the economic field; in return they “re-deployed” 
and invested in the cultural and security fields; internationally, Western powers and NGOs‟ 
awareness of the issue of human and cultural rights grew in response of the growing tensions 
in the region and thanks to information channelled through diaspora networks.  
 
[H3]  New challenges for the state 
The new visibility and topicality of the minority question can be linked with the re-
deployment of the state in the Middle East, namely its retreat from the economic field and, in 
return, its strong involvement in the awakening and promotion of ascribed identities as well as 
in their securitisation.  
Since the mid-1980s, a majority of governments in the region were compelled to adopt 
structural adjustment plans and partially de-regulate their national economies under direct and 
indirect pressure from international financial institutions. In accordance with the new 
liberalisation dogmas, they chose to get rid of their redistributive policies, totally or partially. 
Most of them cut public subventions and reduced their intervention in the domains of health, 
education, lodgings and subsidies to basic commodities. In order to trim the national budget 
they also suppressed a number of public jobs traditionally destined to mask a high level of 
unemployment. These rough policies affected differently the local societies according to their 
heterogeneity. At the core of each patrimonial state, the opening of the market (infitah) to new 
bourgeoisies was organised and controlled by the same political military elite and along the 
same primordial networks of identity (confessional and/or ethnic). Collaboration between 
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political leaders and economic entrepreneurs took the form of clientelist exchange (dyadic and 
reciprocal) based on sectarian and matrimonial proximity. By contrast, distant peripheries, 
powerless social actors such as women and youth, and marginal cultural groups such as 
minority religious communities were affected as access to public goods became restricted 
through inter-personal filters. While facilitating an enlargement of the bourgeoisie, this new 
Middle East crony capitalism enhanced intra-sectarian solidarity and inter-sectarian 
competition by organising either rapprochement or marginalisation of given confessional 
groups.
45
 
As the domestic and foreign private sectors took the lead in the economic field, the 
domination of the state over its society through the redistribution of rents wore away along 
with the discrediting of its legitimizing ideology.
46
 Thereafter the necessity for the state to re-
deploy and invest in domains previously neglected. Monarchies as well as republics 
endeavoured to raise patriotic feelings among their population and substitute a new form of 
attachment to the regime for the trust in the welfare state. Their investment in identity politics 
took a strong discursive dimension: publication of history and civic education school books, 
glorification of turath and its display in newly built museums, and the intensive use of i.t. 
communication tools were used to re-invent and re-format collective identities based on 
affects and private memories.
47
 Moreover, the new patriotism promoted by the regimes 
stressed a new distinction, not between the domestic and the external realms but within the 
country, between the national community and its domestic enemies, between loyal citizens 
and Others whose belongings remained dubious because they were not part of the 
confessional (or ethnic) ruling we-group, and therefore suspect of foreign collusion. The most 
important political issue was now in the name of which identity group the state acted, who 
was regarded as its legitimate owner, and who was entitled to its services.
48
 Therefore, politics 
became increasingly formulated and exerted on a non-negotiable mode as if it implied 
subscribing to a rigid (ideological or religious) belief. Accordingly, politicisation of 
sectarianism became a central aspect of state-building through which the « people » and the 
regime were mutually related within the ideal of a legitimate order. While the nation-state was 
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undermined both in ideal and implementation, ruling coalitions and their opponents were 
transformed into “tribes with flags.”49   
“Re-islamisation” of state and society played a central part in this political re-
configuration. During the modernisation decades, most rulers in the Middle East had 
distanced from Islam. In the globalisation era on the contrary they made extensive use of 
Islam in order to rally popular majorities. They insisted on giving proofs of their own 
religious identity through participation in public prayer or in the hajj to Mecca. They 
encouraged or at least tolerated public display of religious belonging such as the veil for 
women. They financed Muslim social and educational institutions and NGOs, whose quietist 
or Sufi orientation was supposed to counter jihadist influence while compensating for the 
withdrawal of state institutions. While this strategy of re-islamisation strengthened their 
legitimacy in the short run, it also bore middle and long term divisive effects: the public 
display and legitimisation of confessional belongings and the rehabilitation of religious actors 
induced sectarian segregation in the urban space, dissonances in dress codes and ethos, 
separate education, segregated socialities, and generally the organisation of separate cultural 
and political lives – a trend that was reminiscent of the closed society of the late Ottoman 
Empire with its negative effect on civil society and entrepreneurial spirit.  
Finally, identity politics initiated by Middle East authoritarian states in compensation 
for economic liberalisation bore a security dimension. While systematic statistical and police 
control substituted for development in power practices in a Foucaldian manner,
50
 the 
spreading of trans-boundary networks and global interdependence meant that enemies of the 
state had to be fought within, precisely among minority groups supposedly alien to the 
identity and project of the political majority.
51
  In the past, communal groups opposed to the 
government were suspect of collusion with European powers, now they were accused to be 
“agents” of Israel and the United States. Instead of being part of the legitimate political game, 
protestation by minorities became stigmatised as a manipulation by the West and Israel, and 
repressed through land confiscation, restriction of public expression and heavy security rules.  
 
[H3]  Minorities, the “question of the century” 
The rise of identity politics on the domestic scene mirrored the change taking place on 
the international scene. 
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Until recently, international Law legislated exclusively about native minorities in 
colonisation states (e.g. the Inuit people). As for the international covenant on civil and 
political rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966, it protected the cultural and 
religious rights of individual members of minority groups, respecting the sovereignty of the 
state and reflecting its reluctance to take into account sub-national collective aspirations – 
especially of political order.
52
 Then, in the 1990s, the fall of the Soviet Empire drew the 
minority issue “out of the fridge”. A new legitimate problematic prevailed. International Law 
specialists began elaborating a more extensive and politically consequent legal definition of 
the minority. “National minority” was henceforth considered a cultural entity, concentrated on 
a territory, with a past experience of political independence before it was incorporated to a 
larger state entity.
53
  
In this era of globalisation, the minority issue is established as a central preoccupation 
of humanitarian Law and advocacy NGOs. Simultaneously, academic studies, media 
denunciation and pro-active policies overstep international boundaries. International advocacy 
and relief NGOs take the lead in the promotion of the collective rights and protection of the 
groups they judge persecuted due to their confessional (or ethnic) belongings. They keep 
demanding from several Middle Eastern states a revision of their legal status and adoption of 
“universal” criteria for national integration. For every state of the Middle East respect of 
minority rights has become – together with women‟s rights – the barometer of its successful 
transition to democracy. Paradoxically, this criterion is also brandished a contrario to 
denounce the “authoritarian exception” of the Arab and Muslim worlds notwithstanding the 
diversity of cultures in the region and the complex history of each state formation in the 
colonial and post-colonial eras.
54
 But experience shows that whenever the minority issue is 
promoted on the political scene and the powerlessness of a minority underlined, it is done in a 
normative way and for a normative purpose. Formally latent social formations and affiliations 
are activated in order to re-organise hierarchies of power according to a pre-determined 
scheme seemingly convenient for those who manipulate them.
55
 
A critical examination of their ethical stand reveals that while NGO militants have a 
direct and non-ideological knowledge of local situations and generally display proper 
commitment to human rights, their administration, leadership, financial and logistical 
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resources are rooted physically and ideally in Europe and North America. Like the European 
powers who established themselves “protectors” of the Christian communities in the Ottoman 
Empire in the 19
th
 century under the pressure of missionaries and colonial entrepreneurs, the 
major powers of the 21
st
 century allow themselves to ascribe the quality of “minority” to 
groups who never self-designated as such before. They design and implement authoritative 
policies to deal with their cases. As a matter of consequence, together with international 
humanitarian institutions such as the International Criminal Court, NGOs tend to reflect a 
view of the world, with its values, hierarchies and rules, which is far from “neutral”, to use the 
Weberian theory. And like any actor in the international arena they are inevitably influenced 
by (material and symbolic) power pressures.   
In this period of globalisation and inter-dependency, protection of minorities has 
become a “formidable tool for a power to intervene in another state‟s domestic affairs”.56 It 
may be used by a coalition of NGOs and states as was the case for the Darfur in the 2000s; it 
may even be invoked by a great power intervening militarily in a neighbour state like Russia 
“defending the rights” of the Ossetians in Georgia in 2008. Unfortunately, the philosophical 
notion and the legal definition of the minority remain exploited by strategic stakes and 
powers‟ interests. While it rightly emerged from an oppressing silence, the minority issue 
remains controversial and blurred.  
  
 
[H2]  Competition, integration, or adaptation? 
 
Actors of the Middle Eastern public arena, be they states, organised communities or 
even national NGOs, prove sensitive to the current international debate on the minority issue 
– even in countries the most protected from external influence such as the Islamic Republic. 
They also react and adapt to domestic societal dynamics in such way that the politicisation of 
primordial identities can be described as an interactive process: first, it is a two-level process 
taking place simultaneously at state and official institutional level and at societal level of 
routine encounters and dynamics; then the politicisation process implies that state and society 
act, react and carry out successive adjustments of frame and practices. The mimesis between 
the ruling group (the “state”) and the opposition has been underlined in the case of ethnic 
minorities such as the Kurds in Turkey and Arab lands, who borrowed nationalism and other 
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ideological and institutional tools for nation-building from their rulers and adapted them in 
order to dominate their own society.
57
 But mimesis was rarely observed in the case of 
sectarian groups because few of them raised their identity claims to the point of demanding 
large autonomy like some segments of the Assyrian community in Syria or even calling for 
secession like some political parties in southern Sudan or in Lebanon during the civil war.  
Most confessional communities while not adopting such extreme position are prone to 
shape their collective identity according to the “national” model58 i.e. through discrete 
cultural, moral and sociological - not to mention psychological or physical – traits. They also 
borrow the social engineering and political practices experienced by the state in order to build 
their own national community, organise its institutions and mobilise its members. They use 
the same strategies and the same resources – inventing genealogies and hierarchies, 
distributing goods and security, repressing dissidents.
59
 Paradoxically, in their competition for 
the construction of rival we-groups the ruling power and the minority concur in strengthening 
mutually excluding identity boundaries in order to take over limited material and symbolic 
resources. Together they turn dormant and fluctuating collective identities into tangible 
sectarian groups. Diasporas have become a driving force behind this interactive process as 
they exacerbate identity fundamentalisms at the two ends of the migratory network.
60
 As a 
matter of consequence, the minority issue succeeds in opening a new debate and entailing new 
political negotiations within several Middle Eastern states. It challenges the relation between 
the ruling power and the population and calls for a reappraisal of the notion of citizenship. 
 
[H3]  Local identities, nationalism, and the diaspora 
An imported ideology, nationalism was willingly adopted by the ruling elite of the 
Middle East since the 19
th
 century. It gave meaning to their disrupted political life, allowed 
them to rely to their past and project into their future.
61
 Nationalism also spread among 
members of the confessional (and ethnic) elite who did not wish to return to the millet system 
for all its limits and flaws and could not anyway return to it after the imperial order was swept 
by the creation of nations-states. Now, the model for collective demands and the promotion of 
an identity group implied territorial sovereignty, homogeneous cultural identity and political 
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autonomy.
62
 Between conflicting ambitions, there was hardly a middle term: wherever the 
governing state was denying minority rights, the confessional minority denied belonging to 
the nation-state thus raising the level of contest and tension between dominant and minority 
ideologies. 
A noticeable change of the globalisation era is that minorities, once deprived from 
access to the public space, oppressed, and sometimes physically threatened in their homeland, 
turn in numbers from “exit” to “voice” at the instigation of their exiled members.63 In their 
new migratory space, these migrant members generally enjoy freedom of faith and 
expression. Consequently, they are prone to re-politicisation and to turn into “cultural 
mediators” especially when they benefit from dual citizenship. Of course, diaspora 
involvement in democratisation processes in the original homeland should not be over-
estimated as diasporas are generally made of people who migrated to flee from dictatorship 
and secure their family life, not to become militants.
64
 Still, diaspora mediators with the 
support of international and transnational actors contribute to raise the level of conflict 
between state and minorities through their radical nationalist discourse and material support to 
local militants. Geographical distance (as most Middle Eastern migrants settled in North 
America, Europe or Australia) and the passing of time (as some diasporas are several decades 
and sometimes century old) induce them to mythologizing history and re-inventing an 
idealised common identity altogether rooted in romanticised past and projected in dazzling 
future.
65
 Because they ignore the daily accommodation experienced by their fellow minority 
members who stayed in the country, migrants tend to be more radical to the point of 
endangering the local community. 
A striking illustration is offered by the case of the Assyrians. At the turn of the 21
st
 
century, the members of the Nestorian (autonomous) and Chaldean (Catholic) Assyrian 
communities who left southern Turkey, northern Iraq and eastern Syria during the 20
th
 century 
outnumbered four times their local confessional fellows whose number kept dwindling in 
reaction to Kurdish nationalist mobilisations, Arab states repressive policies, and finally the 
wars in Iraq. At the end of the migratory network, Assyrians exilés in North America became 
as mobilised as their Middle Eastern fellows were silent. Anticipating a turn in the regional 
balance of power after the US invasion of Iraq, they began substituting for the failing local 
regimes and financing the construction of schools, health centres and language teaching 
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institutions, and also of over-sized churches in order to raise the visibility of the community, 
especially in the remote underdeveloped Syrian Jazirah.
 
Their numerous and vibrant websites 
and news agencies harboured confusion between confessional and national belonging. On the 
one hand they negotiated with the local states for the sake of the community; on the other 
hand they interpreted any public policy decision as a possible means to victimize it, any 
political vote or deliberation as a survival stake.  And finally they formulated projects of 
autonomy and even independence completely at odd with the reality on the ground.
66
 In this 
matter, they offered a complex example of the mixture of powerlessness and empowerment, 
of escalation and compromise, of attachment and alienation which characterise today‟s 
minorities in the Middle East. 
Truly, “outdoing [the ruling power] has become the self-defence tactic of the 
minority.”67 Such a trend can be observed all over the Middle East in the decade 2000 and 
was emphasized locally by a generation of intellectuals and cadres better educated and 
endowed with better resources than their elders of the previous decades. While the defence 
and promotion of justice and civil rights generally benefits from their enhanced capabilities, 
the durable frustration of minority groups offers a fertile ground for the birth and growth of 
intolerance and mutual exclusion. In reaction, state nationalism stiffens, rooted as it is also in 
cultural references and loaded with collective emotions but armed with superior asymmetric 
power. And like everywhere else in the world, political and sectarian entrepreneurs ride over 
popular feelings to enhance their own power and wealth. The political arena has become the 
battlefield for competing segmented interests instead of the search for common good. Each 
fundamentalism feeds a rival fundamentalism as observed in the growing importance of 
religious parties in Israel and Palestine. The “communitarian disease”, a mixture of collective 
representations and strategic calculation of greedy leaders, which had destroyed Lebanon in 
1975-1990, plagues the Middle East.
68
 
 
 [H3]  Renewing the political exchange 
Neither in its first integrative version nor in its second pluralistic clientelist version 
does the authoritarian state in the Middle East resolve the minority issue. The ruling regimes 
appear unable to overcome increasing minority mobilisations in spite of their ever more 
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powerful and sophisticated communication and security tools. At the end of the first decade of 
the millenium, the state is paralysed in Lebanon; it is threatened with implosion in Iraq; 
shaken by sporadic insurrections in Syria and in several countries of the Peninsula and the 
Maghreb. Nearly two decades after the “great transformation” of 1989, the point at issue 
remains for these states to accommodate individual human rights and cultural demands of 
confessional (and ethnic) minorities and to do so in securing the continuity of public services,  
respecting the rule of Law and guaranteeing the fair managing of collective goods in a secure 
territorial space. After the failure of the development and unanimity model then of the liberal 
divisive model what is now at stake is the renewal of the terms of the political exchange 
between state and society according to a new institutional framework.
69
 For local societies at 
large, this implies a revolutionary turn in constitutional and juridical terms as 
attempted in 2001 by Tunisia and Egypt: the return of the rule of Law and instauration 
of participative democracy. And for confessional (and ethnic) groups, it implies specific 
changes. 
Middle Eastern states will remain stuck in intractable identity conflicts as long as they 
do not envisage a limited reconfiguration of power by adding to the three constitutionally 
legitimate dimensions of citizenship (civic, political and human) the promotion of individual 
and collective cultural rights in their society and polity and more specifically in their 
constitutional Law. Because identity politics has become a dominant preoccupation all over 
the world in this early 21
st
 century, such a change of configuration is needed in many states, 
democratic and authoritarian. However, in the Middle East, where national identity was more 
than often built on the false premises of cultural homogeneity, the political centre can hardly 
acknowledge pluralism without de-legitimizing itself. This is often where the democratization 
process meets its limits and where the notion of political exchange becomes operational: the 
state could exchange some measures of cultural autonomy for the compliance of the minority 
with its collective regulation.  It should make up the economic deficit of its cultural 
peripheries – namely its religious peripheries-, meet some of their symbolic demands in 
matter of public display of identities and collective commemorations, and eventually satisfy 
their claims for more autonomy of cultural and educational institutions. At this point, the state 
would not have to acknowledge a nationalist character to the demands of the sectarian 
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groups.
70
 Co-existence between the (state) national culture and religious sub-cultures would 
subsequently be organised following the principle of “hegemonial exchange” i.e. mutual 
accommodation between the autonomous (better than “powerful”) central state and less 
autonomous (rather than “powerless”) segmented interests “on the basis of commonly 
accepted procedural norms, rules, or understandings”. 71 A positive point in this direction is 
that Arab political sociology establishes a distinction between jinsiyya (nationality) and 
muwâtana (citizenship).This suggests its affinities with the liberal model of distinction 
between cultural and political identities. It opens the way to a possible coexistence of a public 
space blind to cultural differences with differentiated communal spaces
72
 although a delicate 
point concerns the difficulty of “neutralising” Islam in the constitutional framing of the 
Middle East states in view of its historical and ethical weight.   
More generally, a positive political exchange between state centre and religious 
peripheries cannot take place as long as local polities are plagued by a deficit in the respect of 
civic, political and human rights - a deficit affecting every citizen, irrespective of his 
confessional or cultural (or ethnic) identity. Here again, the minority issue in the Middle East 
proves closely related to the issue of democratization and the respect of the rule of Law: on 
the one hand, collective minority demands might be alleviated by the promotion of individual 
rights; on the other hand, respected individuals would become respectful citizens; they might 
promote the virtues and loyalties required by democratic citizenship, among which the 
acceptance of identity differences. Nation-building and minority rights might improve 
dialectically. 
 
[H2] Conclusion 
It is all the more difficult to conclude such a chapter because this early 21
st
 century is 
probably witnessing the peak of identity politics all over the world. Like development theory, 
identity politics might display its flaws, encounter its limits, and be dismissed in the coming 
period. This makes today‟s reflection upon religious minorities in the Middle East all the 
more fragile. It is also why scholars should be wise to keep in mind two basic knowledges in 
social sciences: first, that identity discourses and processes always need to be read in a 
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historical and constructivist perspective;
73
 second, that issues such as the minority issue risk 
to remain assessed through normative lens as long as they are not studied in a comparative 
perspective.  
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